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1 . 0 JNIR()IJ{CI'IQN 
This discussion paper was written in .April 1985 as the ID.Embers of the 
Cornmi ttee of Review, City of Winni:peg Act, 1 were busy establishing their 
individual posi lions on the various issues facing the cornmi ttee. In 
preparation for cornmi ttee discussions in May, each ID.Ember had prepared an 
infonna.l working paper setting out his "leanings" on these issues. The 
purpose of this paper was to sift through the "leanings, " pr.ima.ril y in search 
of cormJOn ground, but also to identify issues where they were evident1 and to 
contribute to a resolution of those issues. Its publication now 1 same two 
years later, serves three proposes, two of which can be set out succinctly. 
First, it offers a corrmenta:r:y on the state of Winnipeg's notable and con-
troversial Unicity scheme in the mid-1980s, as that scheme was undergoing its 
second najor re-evaluation in the decade and a half. 2 Second, for historians 
and students of the political process, it offers some insights into the 
thinking of cornmi ttee ID.Embers after they had been influenced by research and 
an extensive program of public hearings, as -well as private discussions with 
community leaders, but before they had entered upori serious discussions to 
compromise their differences. 
A third reason for the publication of this discussion paper is that it 
gives support to, and elucidates, another paper, also recently published by 
the Institute of Urban Studies. Titled Strong Government, Weak Government: 
Classifying Municipal Structural Change, the paper set out a framework for the 
evaluation of rrnmicipal institutions and argued part of the justification for 
the framework in the following v;ords: 
... in the rrnmicipal v;orld of Canada, England and the United States, as 
-well as elsewhere, the search for appropriate institutions rerrains a 
very real problem, and one which academics, with their perpetually 
unresolved disjlltes over untested theories are doing little or nothing 
to help solve. 
Strong Government, Weak Government sets out a theory which is intended to 
offer a finner foundation for the design of rrnmicipal institutions than -we 
have had in the past. The present paper constitutes the author's first 
attempt to put the theory into practice in developing proposals for structural 
change in a particular rrnmicipality. Since the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating, readers of Strong Government, Weak Government nay find it profitable 
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to evaluate the theory set out there in light of the concrete proposals 
developed in these pages. 
'Ihis :pa.per draws on the academic literature and research. The main data 
are government docurrents, interviews with J?Oliticians and officials, and on-
the-spot observation of the problems and successes of Unici ty. Wherever 
applicable, the :pa.per IIBkes COII!p3risons with other cities, primarily Canadian 
ones. American COII!p3risons are useful as well, but they have to be treated 
with caution because the political, constitutional and ideological enviro:nrrent 
south of the border is nore distinct from our own than a superficial 
examination might suggest. 4 The text of the :pa.per as it was written in 1985, 
follows. No attempt has been rrade to ".improve" it in light of subsequent 
events. H~, where appropriate, brief COllliEilts or explanations have been 
inserted into the footnotes. 
2. 0 cn.H:N 'IHEMES 
It is appropriate to begin with same of the ccmron themes of the "leanings" 
:pa.pers written by :rranbers of the Committee of Review-. The first one that 
springs to the eye is gradualism. Alan Artibise IIBkes it explicit: "I 
strongly support evolutionary change; I envision no radical shifts .... " It is 
clear from the other statements as well that the camrni ttee is not rroving in 
the direction of a rrajor "revamp" of Unicity. Members are identifying 
specific problems and looking for solutions which will spare Winnipeg's 
politicians and officials yet another round of drastic reform. A similarly 
cautious rrood was evident in :rey interviews--in January, February and March, 
with :munici:pa.l leaders--as it was in the hearings. It is clear that there is 
a consensus arrong :munici:pa.l elites that Winnipeg's local goveii1ITE1t has been 
buffeted by the changes of the :pa.st two decades and now needs a period of 
stability to restore its sense of balance. Needless to say, the camrni ttee 
will not necessarily accept the direction of :munici:pa.l leaders r but their 
views--especially when they seem to be unanirrous on a fundamental issue--do 
bear on the question of political feasibility. 
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A second theme which appears in the "leanings" is a reaction against what 
we might call derrocratic constitutionalism at the nnmicipal level: the idea 
that nnmicipal govemnent is a kind of mini-provincial or -federal government 
with analogous claims to autonorey- and a similarly pressing need for strict 
representation by population. At least some of the carrmittee members seem to 
be leaning toward the view that local autonc:::!IT¥ and representation by 
population--desireable as they may be in themselves--cannot always be achieved 
within rrn.micipal bormdaries. Thus Lawrie Cherniak: "I thought I believed in 
representation by population; now I want to protect the imler city and the 
French language. I thought I l::@lieved in :parliamentary derrocracy and home 
rule and :rrasters of our own house; now I'm tending toward some kind of 
provincial takeover or at least a benevolent dictatorship. " Such doubts are 
likely to afflict anyone "Who reviews the Unicity experience. Although the 
1970 white paper which called for the creation of UnicityS did not use the 
term "derrocratic constitutionalism," its advocacy of :parliamentary-style 
government, together with near-heroic provisions for citizen participation, 
:rrade the same point. It is this aspect of Unicity which initially raised the 
highest hopes and which has since engendered the rrost acute disappointment. 
The · carrmittee members "Who are re-evaluating rrn.micipal derrocratic 
constitutionalism are registering their recognition of these realities. 
The preoccupation with derrocratic processes which held sway in 1970 has 
been replaced with a new concern: a belief in the urgent need for action to 
restore Winnipeg's downtown core and its natural heritage, especially the 
ri ver.banks. This concern is rrost clearly :rranifested in D. I. MacD:mald' s 
paper, which gives top priority to the bolstering of the core's "capacity for 
renewal and revitalization by strengthening its political presence on city 
cormcil. " As the staterrent implies, Mr. MacDonald has built his proposals for 
structural refom upon this perception of the developnent needs of downtown 
Winnipeg and St. Boniface. In so doing, he has reversed the priori ties which 
were evident in the 1970 white paper, a reversal which clearly reflects the 
views of :rrany others who are concerned with the affairs of the city of 
Winnipeg. 
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One other theme---which apr-ears fleetingly in the "leanings" papers, and has 
teen heard often in the hearings--deserves ccmren.t: the idea of "simplifying" 
Winnipeg's rrnmicipal structures. The 'WO:r:d "simplification" has a long and 
unhappy history in the annals of rrnmicipal refonn. Next to the idea that we 
can solve a problem by "taking it out of politics, " the notion of simplifying 
rrnmicipal structures is perhaps the oldest illusion in rrnmicipal politics. 
Its psychological roots are the universal penchant to picture the troubles we 
are experiencing right new as a terrible tangle "While envisioning the 
solutions we have in mind as a vista of clarity and simplicity. This illusion 
has produced a rich harvest of rrnmicipal problems. Generation after 
generation of refonrers have fancied themselves to be simplifying rrnmicipal 
structures by introducing new features: revamped council and executive 
structures, revised constituency and electoral systems, separate boa:r:ds and 
camnissions. The net result is a rrorass so impenetrable that the vast 
rna jori ty of citizens have long since given up even trying to understand 
rrnmicipal government. 
The idea of simplification is particularly fraught with pitfalls in the 
current context because Unici ty is one of those rare examples of a municipal 
refonn "Which actually did simplify things. Winnipeg has a unitary government, 
a straightfm:wa:r:d ward system, corrmunities and wards "Which bear an 
understandable relationship to each other and are clearly subo:r:dinate to the 
city, and, rrost significantly, a system of boa:r:ds and commissions "Which have, 
on paper--and to sCJITe extent in reali ty-:teen subsurred under the authority of 
council. The latter feature is the envy of "the 101 goverrrrnents of Metro 
Toronto" 6 and many other municipal areas. There may well be a case for 
building on the genuine simplification already achieved in Winnipeg--for 
example by bringing boa:r:ds and camnissions more clearly under council 
authority. There may even be a case for introducing new complexities, such as 
a riverbanks authority. But it would be unrealistic to entertain the idea 
that new institutional features--say at-large elections of councilors or 
autonorrous ccmmmi ties--would simplify rrnmicipal government in Winnipeg. 
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3. 0 ~llG PGilERS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FRCM '1HE AMERICANS? 
In view of the fact that the Corrmittee of Review is looking for an 
appropriate balance between the powers of the rrayor and those of the council, 
a few general corrments al::xJut :rmmicipal experiences in canada are in order. 
'Ihe notion of trying to achieve such a balance--of apportioning powers between 
the legislative and executive branches--is fundamentally a separation-of-
powers idea. In the British (and Canadian) responsible govemnent tradition, 
the idea of a balance is not meaningful because the executive and legislative 
powers are not supposed to be separate in the first place. 'lb be sure, 
traditional concepts of responsible government have not proven equal to the 
challenges of mcx:ie:r:n bureaucracy, and have therefore been revised. In canada, 
:rmmicipal govemnent has, for three-quarters of a centu:r::y now, been more akin 
to separation-of-powers than to responsible govemnent. Even in the British 
bastion of responsible government, separation-of-powers ideas have been 
incorporated.? 
However, the evolution of a system--and incorporation of ideas from 
elsewhere--does not al::xJlish it, and much depends on how judiciously the new 
ideas are incorporated, ho;v ha:rrocmious they are with the existing system. In 
canada, judicious incorporation has not been our forte. We have tended to 
oscillate between rigid adherence to old ideas, on the one hand, and frantic, 
holus-bolus transplantation of new ones on the other. 'Ihere is no better 
example of this than the rush, at the turn of the centu:r::y, to adopt American, 
separation-of -powers-oriented, :rmmicipal institutions, combined with 
unwillingness to take the necessary measures to make them work. Because of 
the critical way in which they were adopted, these institutions have never fit 
comfortably into our tradition. We have paid for that in various ways, but 
perhaps the most conspicuous way is il:rm:lbility and deadlock: the inability of 
:rmmicipal governments to respond to the challenges they face. 
An example or two will help to make this point clearer. SOIJ:lE: hundreds of 
Canadian cities have adopted the American city :mcmager system, but we have 
been reluctant to wean our public servants from their British-style 
subservience to politicians, and unwilling to give them the sweeping powers of 
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app:>int:rrent "Which .American city managers enjoy. Thus v;e have the spectacle of 
city managers having to rely on -weak councils for advice on appoint:rrents to 
their staff, "While putting on great airs of deference to mayors 'Who themselves 
are mere figureheads. In such circumstances, .irmobility is no su:r:prise. The 
wonder is that anything at all gets done! 
Another set of problems stems from the fact that v;e have separated the 
executive from the legislative branch but have been loathe to give our mayors 
the :pov-;ers of app:>int:rrent and veto 'Which are appropriate to a separate 
executive. In Winnir::eg v;e have had IIRlch opp:>rtunity to observe the 
consequences of such a state of affairs. Mayors, charged with executive 
responsibility, but lacking the maans to discharge them, have found themselves 
resorting to some bizarre stratagems. Fo.nrer Mayor Stephen Juba, unable to 
corrmand the supp:>rt on council 'Which was necessm:y to get things done, often 
chose to grandstand before the voters as their charrpion in an allegedly never-
ending :battle against the machinations of council. The result was deadlock. 8 
Mayor No:r:rie, facing the same constraints, has adopted a different strategy, 
'Which v;e could call the "follo;v-me-I'm-right-behind-you" style of leadership. 
He carefully tests the wind to detennine 'What council will be willing to 
accept, and then advocates that. If necessm:y, he executes 180-d.egree tuJ::ns. 9 
One could argue at length over 'Who has been the better mayor, but the m:Jst 
gennane point is that neither has been able to exercise the kind of 
constructive leadership of 'Which they might have been capable. This is not 
their fault. They have been rraking the best of a :bad situation. 
The simple answer to this problem is to "go all the way" : adopt the 
.American system holus-bolus. But this is pro:bably too simple. Our system, 
like that of the .Americans, comprises a complex blend of our character and our 
institutions. Changing our institutions to imitate those of the .Americans 
will not alter our character, or may alter it in unpredictable ways. We can 
give our city managers the p:JWerS of .American city managers, but can we teach 
them to treat politicians with the disdain .American city managers rese:r:ve for 
their p::>liticians? And if w= do, how will the politicians, and the voters, 
respond? Similarly, we can adopt the "strong-mayor system," but will our 
cities produce a Daly or an Arthur Shaeffer? Do v;e want them to? The better 
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answer is to learn from the .Americans, and to build on the strengths of our 
own system. 
Separation of powers is built on distrust of government. Its basic concept 
is that all gove:rnment has the r:otential for tyranny, but that this r:otential 
can be held in check by di-viding gove:rnment up into factions--legislative, 
executive and judicial--and setting these factions against each other so that 
none can become tyrannical. In an age of :rrBiriD:)th bureaucracies, -we can all 
sympathize with that attitude and learn from it. But that does not mean -we 
are prepared to adopt it in its entirety. For all its strengths, the .American 
system involves a litigious and disputatious approach to public affairs 'Which 
rrakes many Canadians uncomfortable. Canada is the land of Medicare, .Autopac, 
General Welfare Assistance and the UIC: we are not as distrustful of 
government as the .Americans are, and few of us -would be prepared to pay the 
price of rraking ourselves over in their i.In.::ige. 
By the sane token, our system has strengths of its own--strengths -we should 
be able to build on, even as -we learn what the .Americans have to teach us. 
Resr:onsible government, and with it the Canadian PJlitical system, stresses 
the arts of conciliation and Catq?ramise. The prime minister and the House of 
Co.mrrons do not have mch power to punish each other for undesired beha-viour, 
but they have the ability to reward each other, and they have forums--caucus, 
cabinet and the House of Commons itself--in 'Which they can air their 
differences, bargain and negotiate. This system, like the American one 1 is 
far from perfect, but has desireable elements. 
It is hoped that the foregoing general discussion will be some help to the 
corrmi ttee in dealing with the specific questions facing it. We tm:n now to 
these, and begin with a look at the balance of J?O-wer between the mayor and 
council. 
4. 0 MAYOR AND CCXJ.OCIL: DIVISION AND S8ARllG OF J?CmER 
In trying to decide how to strike an appropriate balance between the mayor 
and council, the corrmi ttee will have to consider a number of interrelated 
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matters. We will look at these individually and then draw them together into 
a discussion of the overall issue. 
4 .1 l?oNers of Appoin1:::nEnt and Veto 
These make a matched :pair in the context of the introducto:r.y carrments. 
Veto is a vvea:pon the mayor can use against council, but it does not offer mch 
help to a mayor mo is seeking to encourage council to cooperate with him or 
her. The power of appointment, by contrast, offers either the mayor or 
council, or roth, the :rreans to reNard loyalty and thereby to encourage 
cooperation. In considering powers of appointment, the ccmnittee have same 
significant differences to resolve. I found the following recarrmendations in 
the "leanings" papers: 
That the mayor appoint the Executive Policy Ccmnittee ( EPC) . 
That council appoint the EPC. 
That the mayor chair the EPC. 
That the deputy mayor (chosen by council, it appears) chair the EPC. 
That the mayor be given a veto power "INhich can only be overridden 
by a two-thirds vote of council. 
I will retUIIl to this subject after looking at a number of other matters 
related to it. 
4. 2 Budget Speech/State of the City .k:kb::ess 
It has been suggested that one of the ways the mayor could be clearly 
placed in a leadership position, and at the same time be held accountable for 
his or her leadership, vvould be to require the submission of a budget and/ or 
an a:nnual state-of-the-city speech, followed by a council vote. This could be 
a useful element in a balance of power between the mayor and council, provided 
it were mated with provisions "INhich gave the mayor same means to exert 
pressure on council. A problem with the proposal is posed by the following 
question: What happens if council rejects the budget, or votes non-
confidence after a state-of-the-city speech? The two obvious possible answers 
a:re: 1) a requirement to resubmit the budget, or reconsider the priorities 
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set out in the s:peech or 2) dissolution of council and resignation of the 
mayor, followed by an election. 
The first sanction seems mild and, in the case of entrenched opposition, 
could easily lead to a political tennis game of submission-rejection-
resubmission which could drag on interminably while the city's business grinds 
to a halt. The second seems too strong. In normal circumstances it would 
probably constitute a sanction so damaging to its potential wielders as to 
deter them from using it, thereby placing council in the mayor's vest pocket. 
A combination of the two possibilities seems superior to either one by itself: 
resubmission the first time, dissolution and resignation the second. This 
would give both sides an opportunity to engage in same grandstanding and 
threatening behaviour, while placing a limit on hov;r long that can continue at 
the public's expense. The dreaded sanction of dissolution and resignation at 
the end of the line would put some pressure on both sides to combine their 
grandstanding and threats with serious negotiations. 
4. 3 Position of Boani of Ccmni ssioners 
The position of the board of corrmissioners is relevant to this discussion 
because it bears on the focus of leadership. As matters stand nov;r, the board 
is a significant focus of rmmicipal leadership. If the Corrmi ttee of Review 
wishes to provide IIDre effective political leadership, it seems sensible to 
relocate the focus accordingly, by abolishing the board as a formal decision-
making body. It might well be argued that the need for a fo:r:mal 
administrative decision-making body was stronger in the early 1970s, "When the 
massive responsibility for the Unicity reorganization fell primarily to the 
corrmissioners, than it is today, with rmmicipal business having once again 
settled into a routine. It needs to be added that I have not discussed this 
possibility with the rmmicipal elite and hea:r:d their views. It might be 
prudent to do this before a final decision is made. 
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4.4 Position of Standing Ccmnittees 
'!he position of standing carrmittees is also relevant to the ba.lance of 
power between mayor and conncil, for the same reason that the board's position 
is: focus of leadership. Various :rranbers of the municipal elite have 
expressed the view that the standing carmittees (i.e. excluding the EPC) have 
the effect of diffusing the energies of the political leadership, and of 
conncil generally, with each corrmittee "going its own way" and adding willy-
nill y to the agenda of the EPC and conncil. It seems clear, therefore, that 
the effectiveness of political leadership could be enhanced by a.l:x:Jlition of 
the standing carmi ttees. '!his 'WOuld have to be made mandatory, because 
experience, both in Winni:peg and elsewhere in canada, has shown that 
proliferation of corrmittees is the path of least resistance--one almost 
invariably chosen by conncils when they have the option.10 
4 . 5 :J?or..;ers of M:iyor and Cotmcil: Conclusions 
Having looked at same of the considerations relevant to the achievement of 
a reasonable ba.lance between mayor and conncil, we can naw draw them together 
and try to gauge their effect on the Ccmnittee of Review's deliberations. In 
making that attempt, it is irrlfortant to begin with the recognition that the 
carrmi ttee has not achieved a consensus on the kind of ba.lance for which they 
are looking. D. I. MacDonald, for example, makes it clear that he favours a 
relatively strong conncil and a weak mayor: " ... the mayor would chair conncil 
:rreetings and attend to formalities--the real political power 'WOuld be in the 
hands of the executive policy corrmi ttee and its chair::man. " In making their 
final decision, carrmittee :rrembers will wish to bear in mind that the current 
system features a relatively strong conncil, together with a cornparati vel y 
v.ea.k mayor. Those who calculate that the existing ba.lance of power is the 
best we are likely to get will favour D. I. MacDonald's idea of a strong 
executive policy carrmi ttee headed by the deputy mayor, with the mayor largely 
restricted to cererronial duties. 
A workable strong mayor proposal would be one which 'WOuld give the mayor 
incentive and opportunity to 'WOrk cooperatively with connell. The emphasis--
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as I argued in my discussion of separation of powers and responsible 
government principles--should be on giving the mayor plums to pass out instead 
of clubs to wield, while giving council an opportunity to profit from the 
search for arrangements which balance the concerns of their own constituency 
against the city-wide concerns one hopes the mayor VJOuld be prorroting. A sine 
qua non of a strong-mayor system--on the premises outlined in the 
introduction--is that the mayor have the power to appoint the EPC. This gives 
him or her the means to reward cooperative councilors and thereby stresses 
incentives for action rather than instruments of obstruction. "Whether we like 
it or not, appointments grease the wheels of the political machine, and 
without grease it will not run. This power should be qualified by a 
requirement that the appointments be widely representative of the various 
areas of the city. 
In pursuit of the strong-mayor logic, the executive power now focused on 
the mayor and the EPC should be concentrated by the abolition of standing 
cc:mni ttees. A further concentration of executive power could be achieved by 
abolition of the board of control. The substantial power thus placed in the 
hands of the mayor could be balanced by the provision, discussed above, that 
the mayor annually sub:ni t the city's budget through the EPC to council for its 
approval. Such a provision VJOuld make an annual state-of-the-city address 
superfluous--indeed, unnecessarily cumbersome and time-consuming. 
It VJOuld be compatible with a strong-mayor system to have the mayor chair 
council or to have a deputy mayor--appointed either by the mayor or by council 
from within its ranks--sit as council chair. An advantage of a deputy mayor 
appointed by council is that council VJOuld control its own affairs and gain a 
sense of efficacy from that control. That sense of efficacy should give 
councilors some incentive to eschew the kind of obstructionist stance which is 
a hazard if council is weak .11 A disadvantage is that such an arrangement 
should probably be combined with veto power for the mayor, lest he or she lose 
all control of the council chamber. The trouble with the veto is the fact 1 
noted above, that it stresses obstruction rather than achievement. One can 
easily imagine a mayor who, having lost control of council, launches a veto 
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ca:rrpaign to obstruct council, all the while portraying him or herself as the 
champion of the people. 
However, the alternative--a mayor without veto :power who appoints the 
deputy mayor or chairs council him or herself--is not altogether satisfactory 
either. The danger here is that council, lacking full control, either of its 
own affairs, or of those of its executive policy committee, would lapse into 
lethargy or strike out with obstructionist rreasures--delaying tactics, or 
refusal to pass bylaws or the budget. On balance it seems likely that the 
review carrmittee--assuming it opts for a strong-ma.yor m:x:iel--will be CC'.liTlf8lled. 
by the separation of :powers logic to include a veto :power. Whatever the 
carrmittee does, it will not achieve perfection. 
4. 6 Political Parties 
Before leaving the subject of the executive/legislative balance, a brief 
word about political parties is in order. This is necessitated. by the 
suggestion that it would be desireable to encourage the fo:rnation of an 
opposition on council to balance a strong mayor. There is not much hope for 
this, desireable as it may be in theory. Once 'We have enbraced. the separation 
of :powers logic, there is no realistic prospect for strong party organizations 
of any kind. Even the United. States congress does not have it. In the 
absence of strong parties, the only alternative to a non-partisan council (the 
rrost utopian idea of them all! ) is the weak, shifting coalitions 'We already 
have. We are not likely to be able to do anything about that unless we opt 
for a return to parliamentary, or responsible govenrrnent, institutions . 
5. 0 OIHER ISSUES 
5 .1 Separate Boards, Ccmnissians and Authorities 
The question of creating lx:xlies which wield authority rrore or less 
independently of council--as well as the possibility of depriving authorities 
now in existence of their independent status--has came up in various contexts. 
For one thing there is the proposal that a joint provincial-municipal 
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riverbanks authority be created to promote the preservation and renewal of 
Winnipeg's badly deteriorated riverbanks. A broadened variant of that 
proposal calls for the creation of a capital ccmnission on the :patte:rn of the 
authority "Which m:mages public lands in the national capital region. On the 
other hand, the review corrmittee is considering complaints that various 
existing authorities--such as the Police Corrmission, the Winnipeg Enterprises 
Board and the Winnipeg Business Developnent Corporation--are too independent 
of council, along with suggestions that they be brought under control. 
Despite the apparent contradiction between these two impulses--to create one 
board while abolishing others--there is a case to be made for both. The case 
is most effectively made if the problem is placed in its historical context. 
Separate boards and ccmnissions are one of the sources of the municipal 
political weakness "Which made it necessary to write so pessimistically--in the 
previous section of this :paper--about the prospects of vigorous leadership in 
the city of Winnipeg. During the urban reform movement at the turn of the 
century, such bodies were created in great nmnbers, :partly in order to achieve 
more effective administration, but also as :part of a calculated effort to 
undermine municipal politicians "Who were seen in business circles as being 
dangerously representative of the interests of immigrants, petty traders and 
working people.l2 Although the specific ideological impulses of the tum-of-
the-century reform movement have been diluted somewhat, the idea that it is 
desireable to keep municipal politicians weak is still very ImlCh a :part of 
current munici:pal conventional wisdom, and separate boards and corrmissions are 
still helping to deprive municipal politicians of their effectiveness and 
prestige by rem:::wing large slices of municipal authority from them . 
.Any attempts to reverse this state of affairs are seriously hampered, both 
by the conventional wisdom "Which sees municipal activities as being somehow 
sanitized "When they are "removed from politics," and by pressures from 
specific groups (educators, librarians, lawyers and so forth) "Whose interests 
are served by the fact that the activities most important to them (schools, 
libraries and police forces, for example) are insulated from public scrutiny 
focusing upon and emanating from city hall. It is instructive to view the 
provisions of the City of Winnipeg Act in this context. The authors of the 
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1970 white paper and the Unicity legislation--Meyer Brownstone and I:ennis 
Hefferon in p:rrticular--decided to restore the powers which rnunici:pU 
:I;Oliticians had lost to the authorities and had the :I;Olitical shreM:iness to 
find a way of doing it without directly confronting either the interest groups 
or the conventional wisdc::m. 
There is no space here to go into the details of Winnipeg 1 s mmy pre-
Unici ty boards, ccmnissions and authorities, but in general tenus, the 
Brownstone-Hefferon strate:]Yl3 was to retain the appearance of the boards I 
independence while deftly rerroving its substance, simply by providing that the 
majority of board. manbers be manbers of city council. The stratagen -worked. 
Although initially there -were S:I;Oradic complaints from interest groups that 
their favourite boards had lost their independence, the fact that the boards 
-were still manifestly in existence made it difficult to mount a concerted 
attack on the new order of things. In the meanti.rre, the new order has l::ecane 
the status quo, and the complaints seen to have died out. 
We can now consider the cu:rrent situation. If the Committee of Review 
approves of the initiatives of 1970-71, it can now recarnrrend their 
consolidation, along with further initiatives in the same direction. In 
theory, the committee could reccmnend al::Dlition of the b:xlies in question. A 
more judicious approach might be to recarrnend that council have the option of 
appointing either councilors or citizens to the b:xlies, depending on whether 
interest group p:rrtici:p3.tion appears to be desireable. The trouble with this 
approach is that council decisions might be motivated less by :I;Olicy 
considerations than by a restless quest for per diems and tickets to Jets 1 
garres and :I;Olicemen 1 s balls. Possibly the most constructive approach -would be 
to give council a choice between maintenance of the status quo and council 
takeover of each of the various boards' activities, to the accompaniment of 
each board. 1 s al::Dli tion. A takeover -would be conspicuous enough to require 
justification on p:Jlicy grounds, and the willingness to make such 
justifications would offer sane indication of council 1 s pre:p3.redness to 
discharge the obligations involved. In the most optimistic scenario, a series 
of successive takeovers would signify a gradual expansion of conncil 1 s 
effectiveness and :I;Olitical res:I;Onsibility. It might well be recarnrrended that 
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the province monitor this process with a view to ensuring that it does indeed 
signify acceptance of responsibility. 
A riverbanks authority or capital ccmnission is a very different rratter 
which--as the ccmnittee is no doubt aware--needs to be argued in different 
terms. The case for such a body is not rerroval of any activities from the 
political sphere, but the more effective coordination of the activities of two 
levels of government. In Winnipeg, it seems an idea whose time has come. 
5. 2 Crnmnnity Ccmnittees' Responsibilities 
The "leanings" papers contain various proposals which affect the 
responsibilities of cc:mrnmity ccmnittees. Some call for lxmndaJ::y changes 
designed to ensure that the ccmnittees do a better job of representing natural 
cc:mrnmities or to prorrote the revitalization of the dON!ltON!l core. Others 
involve changes in the ccmnittees' responsibilities. All of these proposals 
seem feasible. I would strike only one note of caution, reflecting a point 
already broached in the introduction of this paper. :Any move to allow 
cc:mrnmity ccmnittees to exercise their responsibilities independently--i.e. 
other than by the authority of council--is tantamount to an abandonment of the 
Unicity concept and a return to a two-tier system. It can be done, but it 
would involve najor changes, it would not simplify things--on the contra.:ry, it 
would complicate them substantially--and it is questionable whether there is 
political support for such a move. 
5. 3 "Parochialism" and At-large Elections 
There is a widespread belief among members of the municipal elite--which 
seems at various times to have been reflected on the review ccmni ttee--that 
municipal politics in Winnipeg is afflicted by parochialism, so that those who 
are pursuing the well-being of the city as a whole find themselves blocked by 
the advocates of narrow, ward-based interests. Intuitively1 that proposition 
seems to make sense, but on examination it 'becomes clear that it is largely 
subjective. I asked each of the elites who complained about parochialism to 
give me an example of a decision that illustrated his or her view. For each 
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of the examples I heard, an argurrent could easily have been :rrade that it was 
the alleged parochialists who "Were in fact the pursuers of the city's overall 
welfare. For example, a number of people cited the cancellation of the 
Sherbrook-McGregor overpass as an example of the triumph of downtown 
:p:rrochialism. If the decision had gone the other way, h~, it could as 
easily have been portrayed as suburban north-end pa.rochialism, saddling the 
city with a key link in an unwanted future expressway system. 
Whether we are confronted with :p:rrochialism, therefore, or simply with an 
elite frustrated because they are not getting their way as easily as they 
WJuld like, is a :rratter of opinion. There is no conceivable evidence that 
WJuld settle the question conclusively. The proponents of the parochialism 
thesis generally argue in favour of at-large elections within each cormrunity 
to replace the current ward system. My opinion is that the wards are 
perfolllling a valuable representative function and that any legiti:rrate concerns 
about the failure of city-wide leadership can :be rrore effectively addressed 
through the provisions--discussed above--for strengthening of the :rrayor and 
the EPC, than by abolition of the ward system. 
6. 0 <XH:LUSICN 
It will by now :be obvious to the reader that I share the skepticism evident 
in the "leanings" pa.pers about the prospects for greater rrnmicipa.l autonomy. 
The city has done Irn.lch to prorrote the deterioration of the core, and it was 
only the intervention of senior gaverrl!IE!lts which offered a ray of hope for a 
reversal. Likewise, if we wait for the city to halt the erosion of the 
riverbanks, we will probably wait in vain. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate 
to end on a very cautiously optimistic note. In a WJrld increasingly growing 
disenchanted with large bureaucracies, there nay :be an important future for 
local authorities. We cannot now seriously_ build toward such a future, 
because presently our local institutions are so derroralized that even the 
people involved in them have largely lost faith in them. But we can lay a 
ground.vvork for which our children nay sareday l:e grateful, by strengthening 
local political institutions, by giving politicians some incentives for 
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